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ABSTRACT
Health Information Technology has spurred the development of distributed
systems known as Health Information Exchanges (HIEs) to enable the shar-
ing of patient records between different health care organizations. Partici-
pants using these exchanges wish to disclose the minimum possible amount
of information that is needed due to patient privacy concerns over sensitive
medical information. Therefore, broker-based HIEs aim to keep limited in-
formation in exchange repositories and to ensure faster and more efficient
patient care. It is essential to audit these exchanges carefully to minimize
the risk of illegitimate data sharing. This thesis presents a design for au-
diting broker-based HIEs in a way that controls the information available in
audit logs and regulates its release during audit investigations based on the
requirements of applicable privacy policy. In our design, we utilized formal
rules to verify access to HIE and adopted Hierarchical Identity-Based En-
cryption (HIBE) to support the staged release of data required for audits
and a balance between automated and manual reviews. We test our method-
ology with a consolidated and centralized audit source that incorporates a
standard for auditing HIEs called the Audit Trail and Node Authentication
Profile (ATNA) protocol with supplementary audit documentation from HIE
participants.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Broker-based HIEs have been utilized to enable institutions to ensure the
secure transmission of patient medical documents using well-known infras-
tructures such as XDS [1]. Brokers retain the index for each document as well
as the repository address where each document is stored instead of using a
centralized repository for documents. Broker-based exchanges provide some
level of indexing, provide for the transport of data, and are equipped with
security measures such as authentication and audit, often without storing
key data themselves except during transmission. These systems have come
into wide use in the healthcare field and the goal of HIEs is to be adopted for
the international sharing of EHRs to disclose medical records in a standard
format.
An additional benefit of the broker system is that the amount of medical
data kept on the HIE side for sharing medical records between different orga-
nizations can be minimized to mitigate HIE consumers privacy concerns. For
example, in the United States, there are many state-sponsored HIE systems
where the state is reluctant to hold EMR data themselves because of citizen
concerns about sharing health data with government. Broker systems can
improve patient care as well as prevent unnecessary disclosure of information
during the exchange.
However, it is a challenge for broker-based HIEs to protect the privacy of
information in their audit logs, including any supplementary documentation,
during the audit process that is used for ongoing monitoring and specific
investigations of potentially illegitimate access to medical records. The more
audit data the HIE holds, the better it can ensure the legitimacy of access to
medical records through its audits, but the more risk there is that the audit
process itself will compromise privacy. Furthermore, doing manual audits is
typically not feasible since thousands of accesses to the HIE occur every day.
Hence, the auditing process needs to be automatic, which will require the
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HIE to keep as much standardized audit information as possible so that it is
there when needed.
The goal of this thesis is to suggest the design for a privacy-preserving au-
dit infrastructure that includes both automated auditing using a logic-based
audit algorithm and staged disclosure through HIBE of information neces-
sary to conclude an effective audit. In particular, we developed an audit
subsystem in which HIBE [2] is used in coordination with a logic-based au-
dit algorithm [3] to limit the information disclosed to the auditor to only that
which is needed for the specific audit in question. Our system uses HIBE to
encrypt sensitive data on the audit logs assigning appropriate levels of sen-
sitivity. The auditor uses the audit algorithm to decide which parts of the
log need to be decrypted in order to determine whether a legitimate treat-
ment relationship exists between the patient and the accessing HIE provider.
HIBE provides a convenient way to encrypt audit logs at a fine granularity
(i.e., each event is encrypted using keys derived from the identifiers partic-
ipating in that event) and limits auditors to decrypting the minimum data
required. HIE transmission of information occurs frequently, yet audits are
relatively rare, so our framework provides an effective and efficient audit pro-
cedure for such limited and infrequent decryption of data. We also propose
the idea of extending the audit algorithm to provide understandable expla-
nations about any particular access rather than only indicating whether an
access is consistent with or in violation of applicable policy. We design an
audit architecture that augments HIEs using the ATNA [1] profile, the cur-
rent standard for HIE audits; supports HIBE encryption of audit logs; and
an provides an explanation-enabled audit procedure. A key feature of the
design inspired by the state HIEs in Maryland and Illinois is the ability to
combine the ATNA data with external documentation that is fed into the
audit algorithm. Our main contribution lies in the design and implementa-
tion of a practical system using both a novel encryption technique and audit
algorithm.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides back-
ground on HIEs and HIBE, and Chapter 3 discusses related work. Chapter 4
is an overview of the architecture of our design and an introduction to our
sample audit scenario. Next, Chapter 5 details the hierarchical encryption al-
gorithm. Chapter 6 introduces the audit algorithm used in our architecture,
and provides an example of how our our infrastructure is used to audit access
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and to produce explanations of audit results. Chapter 7 presents the imple-
mentation of our prototype and the results of our evaluation of it. Chapter
8 points out the limitations of this work. Finally, Chapter 9 incorporates
a user access control mechanism into the audit architecture and discusses
how this work could be extended in the future to other access control uses.
Chapter 10 shows conclusion.
This thesis draws heavily on joint work described in the CODASPY paper
by Oh et al. [4]. The author of this dissertation primarily worked on the
topics in Chapters 4 and 6 which are discussed in [4] and on the material in
Chapter 7, which is not included in [4].
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 Audit Standard for HIE
A Health Information Exchange (HIE) is a system for parties to electronically
transmit health-related information between various organizations. HIEs
promise benefits such as reducing duplication of services and supporting
the connection across statewide, regional and local services; however, many
health-care providers are reluctant to use HIE due to patient concerns about
privacy, since an HIE enables individual health information to be collected
in a centralized repository [5]. To appease privacy concerns, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommends twelve services
[6] to protect data from being compromised and create a secure HIE envi-
ronment. One of these twelve services involves collecting and communicating
audit logs that define, identify, and communicate security-related events and
data that should be gathered, consistent with applicable policy. According to
the Maryland Health Care Commission [7], HIE has to implement periodic
audit procedures to determine whether improper access, use, or disclosure
has been made, informing HIE consumers or other authorized users when an
audit indicates a policy violation. These audits review, at a minimum, the
following information: Identity of Protected Health Information (PHI) orig-
inator, description of the consumer’s actions, identity of the users accessing
the patient record, the organization the users are involved in, access date and
time, source and type of PHI, date and time the PHI became available to
the HIE, the user’s date of registration with HIE and the user’s access level
during access.
The Audit Trail and Node Authentication (ATNA) [1] Profile, an IHE
Integration standard, is an audit mechanism reflecting such security guide-
lines, with three strengths. First, it generates and keeps audit records in a
4
centralized audit repository controlled by a security officer; it can be readily
adapted to the typical HIE environment involving Cross Document Sharing
(XDS) [1] and it would be compliant with HIPAA [8]. IHE stipulates events
that must be recorded in the audit trail, which are defined in XDS.b [9]. Sec-
ond, ATNA is compatible with diverse types of healthcare enterprises since it
generates audit logs based on existing standards, such as HL7 [10]. To make
it compatible, the ATNA profile suggests using Security Audit and Access
Accountability Message XML Data Definitions for Healthcare Applications
(RFC-3881) [11], which define an XML schema to report security-related
events described with other standards such as ASTM [12], HL7, and DI-
COM [13]. Third, ATNA offers certificate-based bi-directional authentication
between users and nodes before transactions occur to provide data integrity
and secure transmission. The ATNA logs contain information relevant to a
security audit (which patient’s PHI was accessed, which user accessed it, and
what user or node authentication failures were reported), to identify specific
evidence of policy violations with any particular access after the fact.
In short, ATNA provides infrastructure for auditing the HIE. It is still
necessary to develop ways to stipulate policies and carry out the analysis of
audit events on ATNA standard audit logs. Moreover, it may be necessary to
work with external sources of information that are not present in ATNA logs
to achieve the overall goals of auditing the HIE. For instance, if one wishes
to use billing records to confirm that an access to a record has been made to
provide a (billed) service, then it may be desirable to integrate billing records
into the underlying analytic engine rather than trying to make billing records
a part of ATNA.
2.2 Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption
HIBE [14, 2, 15, 16, 17] is a form of IBE for hierarchical structures. IBE
allows a sender to encrypt messages based on a receiver’s identity, such as an
e-mail address. The sender can encrypt a message for the receiver using IBE
before the receiver gets a secret key from a KGC. The KGC generates a secret
key to a user commensurate with the level of sensitivity of the data that the
user needs to access. The private key will allow access at that level, or depth,
in the hierarchy and at all lower levels and will also delegate authority to the
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holder of the private key to generate secret keys to users at lower levels. In
other words, this is one-way access and delegation, so that a user at level k
can generate a secret key for a user at any level lower than k, but lower level
users can not use their secret keys to make secret keys for users at higher
levels in the hierarchy. Upper level users who generate lower level keys are
referred to as parents in the hierarchical structure. The HIBE system uses
the following five algorithms.
HIBE.Setup : (k, L) 7→ {mk,Pub} takes security parameter k and maximum
depth L, and outputs a master key mk and public parameters Pub.
HIBE.Extract : (Pub,mk, ID) 7→ skID takes the public parameters Pub, the
master key mk and an identity ID = (id1, ..., id`) of depth `(≤ L), and outputs
a secret key skID for the identity ID.
HIBE.Delegate : (Pub, skID′ , ID) 7→ skID takes the public parameters Pub,
a parent’s secret key skID′ where the parent’s identity ID
′ = (id1, ..., id`′) of
depth `′(< ` ≤ L), and the child’s identity ID = (id1, ..., id`) of depth `. Then
the algorithm outputs a secret key skID for the identity ID.
HIBE.Encrypt(Pub, ID,Msg) 7→ CT takes the public parameters Pub, an
identity ID and a message Msg, and outputs a ciphertext CT.
HIBE.Decrypt : (Pub, skID,CT) 7→ Msg takes the public parameters Pub, a
secret key skID and a ciphertext CT, and outputs a message Msg.
We will later describe how to use HIBE for a workable system to encrypt
external data for later use by HIE auditors, as well as describing the se-
curity procedures that will effectively limit access to that external data in
the course of a formal complaint regarding legitimacy of access. There are
various HIBE systems that satisfy different properties and security goals. It
is important to select an HIBE system for our system with constant and
small ciphertext such as [2], since such a system will provide storage and
decryption efficiency regardless of hierarchy depth. Encrypted sensitive data
should rarely be decrypted for maximum patient privacy protection; how-
ever, encrypted sensitive data needs to be stored by HIE in the event of a
health privacy infringement investigation. Therefore, our HIBE systems will
use minimal ciphertext size to achieve maximum privacy protection with a
minimum of storage space.
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CHAPTER 3
RELATED WORKS
3.1 Audit Healthcare Domain.
Due to the wealth of private patient information shared in distributed HCOs,
a secure audit is indispensible to identifying specific evidence when suspicious
access is detected. Previous works have envisaged a scientific and technical
approach to audit the healthcare system. Gunter et al. [18] introduce ARIP
to establish appropriate access rules for HCOs based on their work flows
and social networks by analyzing audit logs and attributes of HCOs. Their
methodology is similar to ours in analyzing audit logs to justify access to
patient health information. However, their work is not feasible for infras-
tructure currently in place at HCOs, while our work is applicable to the
real-world heterogeneous healthcare environment with IHE standard based
audit infrastructure. In addition, Fabbri and LeFevre [19, 20] have proposed
explanation-based auditing, which enables patients to review access to their
health records with human interpretable explanations. They adopt machine
learning approach to automatically generate log explanation while we use the
logic-based algorithm to identify the legitimacy of access based on the privacy
policy. In addition, they apply their algorithm to existing hospital logs only
and do not actually produce interface with any existing front-end healthcare
system. Moreover, while their explanations describe the reason for a par-
ticular user access, they cannot use the explanation to automatically show
legitimacy relative to a given policy. In contrast, our work directly checks
the legitimacy of access based on applicable privacy law and policy. Some
prior work takes a technical approach, adopting ATNA to ensure HIPAA
compliance and attempting to integrate diverse HCOs. Gregg [21] builds an
audit interface utilizing ATNA for the audit logs from a PACS. Azkia et al’s
similar work [22] converts ATNA audit records generated by their system to
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be incorporated into the Organization Based Access Control (OrBAC) pol-
icy. However, their works do not show how their policy model is specifically
applicable to existing policies and, nor does it consider privacy concerns dur-
ing audit while our work encodes ONC guidance into first-order logic and
includes encryption for privacy-aware audit.
3.2 Audit Log Encryption.
The HIE audit log presents unique challenges because it can and should be
used as a tool for detecting inappropriate access to private IIHI, and yet ac-
cess to such information in the healthcare environment often involves special
situations that make it hard to limit the ability of providers to access IIHI.
These special situations include emergencies. We share the goal of previous
encryptions of audit logs [23, 24, 25] to not only protect against malicious
attackers, but also to limit exposure of private information in the log to an
authorized auditor. Our approach is different from previous methods for
encrypting audit logs because we supplement internal log information with
external data, which we encrypt with HIBE, allowing auditors to access only
the minimum necessary data. In doing so, our scheme creates an identity,
a descriptive label, using terms that do not need to be encrypted, such as
unidentifiable codes for patient, provider, and type and date of visit, for
the audit log entry, allowing the auditor to find the log needed without the
more cumbersome encrypted keyword approach previously used. In previous
schemes, such as Waters et al. [25], the auditor has to match all encrypted
keywords with a given trapdoor that contains those words. This makes it
secure but extremely inefficient.
3.3 Misuse Detection of Bitcoin
Bitcoin is an internet currency created in 2009 that is fully decentralized; it
has no association with banks or governments [26]. Bitcoin operates in blocks
of transactions that form chains that show that a sequence of transactions
were verified by a majority of the Bitcoin network’s computing power. This
majority power is presumed to be made up of honest users and so the system
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now trusts people to do the right thing. However, Bitcoin is used only min-
imally for actual trading transactions, and misuse, such as double-spending
[27, 28], has been reported, the measure for which is generally simply ad-
vertising the misuse if it is detected. If an audit mechanism were developed
that could properly audit breaches of security in a privacy-preserving man-
ner, bitcoins could become more widely accepted. Our infrastructure and
HIBE key system could be useful for that purpose.
3.4 Algorithms for Policy Compliance Checking.
We build on Garg et al.s algorithm reduce for auditing policies over incom-
plete logs [3]. We inherit the policy language used by the reduce algorithm,
which is a first-order logic that can encode first-order LTL formulas. Policies
that are naturally specified in LTL can be easily translated to formulas in
this logic. There has been much work on compliance checking of policies ex-
pressed in LTL [29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34]. Most of the work focuses on runtime
monitoring. In contrast, we assume that logs are recorded by audit agents,
and post-hoc audit is applied to these logs. To our knowledge, reduce is the
only policy-based log audit algorithm that can handle incomplete logs. We
leverage reduces capability to handle incomplete logs to integrate encrypted
logs. One of our contributions is to extend reduce to further generate expla-
nations for the output of the algorithm.
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CHAPTER 4
OVERVIEW
4.1 Audit Architecture
Figure 1 illustrates HIE with its ATNA repository, HIE consumers such as
hospitals and the relationship of our proposed audit infrastructure to these.
The audit infrastructure will be used to check the legitimacy of each ac-
cess to HIE and to generate a corresponding log explanation. The audit
system consists of an audit data processor (ADP), audit agent, audit algo-
rithm and auditor viewer. The ADP collects HIE ATNA logs and external
documentation which is subsequently encrypted converts them into specific
DB schema of the Audit Logs. Converted audit records are stored in the
Audit Logs through the audit agent. The audit algorithm informs specific
encrypted information additionally needed to verify legitimacy of access af-
ter first iteration and the audit agent identifies and decrypts them. The
audit algorithm ultimately verifies whether the access is legitimate with de-
crypted audit records. In addition, the ADP has the Key Generate Center
(KGC) issuing a secret key for the decryption at the particular level of sensi-
tivity of additionally required information that the algorithm has identified
to confirm legitimacy of access. After the auditor viewer formats the result
of the audit algorithm in a more user friendly format, human interpretable
log explanation is presented in the auditor viewer upon request or periodic
auditing.
4.1.1 Health Information Exchange (HIE)
We have simulated the HIE system based on IHE Integration profile transac-
tions [9]. When a doctor submits a medical record to HIE for a new patient,
a new patient index is created by the HIE’s patient identity actor, the doc-
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Figure 4.1: HIE Audit Infrastructure
ument goes through the HIE’s document repository, and meta data for the
document location is kept in the HIE’s document registry. HIE provides the
document viewer which is an interface for use by a requesting client to re-
quest medical documents through the HIE. When such a request is made,
it goes through the document registry, which obtains the patient ID stored
in the HIE’s master patient index (MPI). A document repository ID and
document ID are then sent back to the document viewer for the request to
be transmitted to the holder of the document. When the HIE’s document
source receives a patient medical document from the HIE consumer such as
a hospital which is an originator of a Document, it is transmitted through
the document repository, which acts as a broker to send the document to
the requesting client. The HIE also has the electronic referral actor which
handles the referral process electronically. Apart from this, there is a master
provider directory with a continually updated list of healthcare providers,
consistent with the IHE Integration Profile Transaction add/update.
4.1.2 External Parties
We call the owners of supplementary external documentation the external
parties assuming that the hospitals and the PMP will routinely provide doc-
11
umentation related to each HIE access, such as medical bills, patient regis-
tration, and prescriptions to the ADP, for use in subsequent audits. The link
between the HIE and the ADP is the ID-CRM, which will link each exter-
nal party’s internal patient identifier and its user ID and hospital ID with
the HIE’s patient ID, user ID and hospital ID, the latter being described in
one of IHE standards, Patient Identifier Cross-referencing (PIX). Sources of
the external documentation include the PMP, the patient registration (PR),
and the medical billing (BL). The PMP [35] is a centralized repository man-
aged by the state of Illinois and prescribers and dispensers are required to
report prescription details for controlled substances. The PMP reports the
prescription details such as recipient’s name, address and drug code of con-
trolled substances to prove the treatment relationship with a patient whose
health information is accessed via the HIE. The details about the external
documentation simulation are presented in Chapter 7.
4.1.3 Audit data Collector (AC) Path
Our simulated HIE generates XML-based ATNA logs generated by IHE Inte-
gration Profile transactions as follows: Patient Identity Feed (ITI-8), assign-
ing new patient ID to a new patient, which is subsequently stored in MPI;
Provide and Register Document Set-b (ITI-41), submitting a medical docu-
ment for a new patient to the document repository; Retrieve Document Set
(ITI-43), retrieving a patient’s medical document upon request; and Elec-
tronic Referrals. The ATNA logs are then stored in the ATNA repository.
The sensitive entries in the ATNA logs and external documentation will be
encrypted using Hierarchical Identity based Encryption in the ADP. Specific
encryption procedures are introduced in Chapter 5. Once encrypted, all ci-
phertext and plaintext entries coming through the ADP will be stored in the
Audit Logs as audit records and will wait for a request to analyze them.
4.1.4 Access Analysis (AA) Path
When an auditor tries to audit HIE logs, he/she has to connect to a web
auditor portal, the auditor viewer. The auditor is not allowed to access to
other parties in audit infrastructure, which prevents being directly disclosed
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to audit records. Once an auditor makes a request to analyze a specific
access shown in HIE log, an auditor’s query including patient ID, provider
ID and event time is sent to the audit agent. Based on this auditor-defined
condition, the audit agent looks for matched information among plain text
information. Before sending it to the audit algorithm called reduce, the audit
agent converts it into the predicate table schema which the audit algorithm
can read. In addition, HIE policy is encoded in a language that reduce
understands and then encoded policy is also transmitted to reduce. reduce
then starts the first iteration.
4.1.5 Supplement Resolution (SR) Path
After investigating a log entry, reduce returns results indicating what specific
supplementary information is necessary to determine legitimacy of access,
which is called residual. Based on all pieces of residual, the audit agent can
infer patient ID, hospital ID, event time and what kinds of information it
needs, such as patient visit history. That is, the audit agent can identify
necessary IDs and specifically required encrypted column names based on
the instances and name of returned the predicates in residual. When the
audit agent sends a data ID or multiple IDs, the KGC creates a secret key or
multiple secret keys and sends to the audit agent. The audit agent decrypts
the requisite information which is identified based on residual and captures
it in the predicate table schema. Finally, it sends additional the predicate
tables to the audit algorithm for the second iteration. The decryption process
is circumstantiated in Chapter 5.
4.1.6 Explanation Creator (EC) Path
After reduce checks whether the audit records conform to policy, it returns
true and explanation containing satisfying sub-clause and substitutions if
the policy is satisfied. If not, reduce returns false and explanation including
unsatisfying sub-clause and substitutions. The details about explanation
generated by the algorithm are described in Chapter 6. Based on return
values, the auditor viewer translates them into human-understandable The
explanations and provides them to the auditor. Serious policy violations
13
associated with access are sent to the HIE consumers through the notification
proxy shown in Figure 1.
4.2 Audit Scenario
We illustrate an audit scenario using the infrastructure in Figure 4.1. Assume
that an auditor verifies Dr. John Kosta’s access to Alice’s medical record
disclosing her mental health based on the ONC privacy policy [36]. To verify
access, patient medical billing documentation issued after the observation in
the emergency room must be seen. The policy is encoded below:
ϕpol =
∀p1, p2,m, q, t, ty, va, tp, vl, o, p, c.(send(p1, p2,m, t)∧
hasattrof(m, q)∧
includes(m, ty, va))∧
patientInfo(q, tp, vl, t)∧
organization(p2, o, t)∧
insuranceInfo(q, p, c, t))
⊃ (∃t′.medical-bill(q, visit− history, t′)∧
timein(t, t′, t+365)∧
visits-in-bill(q, p2, vl, o, t
′))
∨(∃t′.medical-bill(q, observation, t′)
∧timein(t, t′, t+365)
observes-in-bill(q, p2, ty, va, o, t
′))
∧insurance(q, p,c, t′))
In words, if the log shows that entity p1 sends to entity p2 a message m at
time t, m describes patient q at time t, m includes ty such as observation ID
and va such as order type and observation value , then patient q is provided
with service vl in the hospital, such as inpatient, p2 works in organization o,
patient q has a insurance plan p of company c , consequent patient’s medical
bill issued within one year involves patient’s insurance company c, plan p
and other entries have to be matched with one of the following cases: First,
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order information in medical bill includes that provider p2 from the hospital
o makes an order va for patient q at time t′. Second, visit history information
in medical bill contains that patient q visits provider p2 in the hospital o for
vl service at time t′. Third, observation information in medical bill shows
that provider p2 observes patient q in the hospital o at time t
′ and the result
indicates that observation ID is ty and observation value is va. Dr. Kosta’s
access generated an ATNA log whose name is the Retrieve Document Set
defined by IHE standard. Every time ADP gathers external documentation
from the PMP and HIE facilitated hospitals regularly, the ADP encrypts it
before sending to Audit Agent’s Audit Logs repository.
Once the audit records are imported in the Audit Logs, it waits for the
auditor viewer’s request. A few month later, the auditor makes a request to
analyze Dr. Kosta’s access. The auditor viewer sends Dr. Kosta ’s HIE user
ID (kos12), Alice’ patient ID (eeb728473e1949a) and the specific access event
time (2013:09:08:10:18:41) for subsequent audit agent’s queries matched log
entries from the Audit Logs repository. Once the audit agent locates them, it
converts them into the predicate table schema , for example, send(p1,p2,m,t),
required by reduce and encodes the policy in a first-order logic. Then, the
audit agent sends them to reduce for the first iteration. After this first step,
reduce returns residual inferring required specific encrypted columns and a
searching key to find matched precise rows in the table of the Audit Logs.
The audit agent requests secret keys to the KGC based on combination of
a primary key with specific column name which will be decrypted. Espe-
cially, in this scenario, since residual informed that necessary supplementary
information is Predicate1 requiring decryption up to level1 or Predicate2 re-
quiring decryption up to level2, the KGC has three choices to issue secret
keys, dIDlevel2 , dIDlevel1 and both. Eventually, the KGC sends dIDlevel2 to decrypt
lower level. This is one of key advantages using HIBE in this paper. Hav-
ing retrieved secret key, the audit agent decrypts required specific columns
which are (provider-level1, visitsInBill-level2) in the Audit Logs and puts them
in visits-in-bill table again. The log entries conform to the policy and reduce
returns true and the explanation. Based on reduce’s returned values, the
auditor viewer creates the following human-understandable explanation:
Dr. Kosta’s access to Alice’s record is justified because Alice’s medical bill
shows that she visits Dr. Kosta in emergency at time t.
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If the auditor viewer presents specific explanations showing serious policy
violations, the viewer consequently informs the HIE consumers of the viola-
tion, which will be processed through the notification proxy. This reporting
process is enforced by our audit system.
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CHAPTER 5
HIERARCHICAL ENCRYPTION
In this chapter, we describe how we encrypt and decrypt external audit logs,
specifically documentation, from the HCOs using HIBE for privacy protec-
tion during audits. There are various HIBE schemes that satisfy different
properties and security goals. It is important to select a HIBE scheme with
constant, small-size ciphertexts, e.g. [2], since such a scheme will optimize
storage cost regardless of hierarchy depth. Even though privacy infringement
investigations are rare in practice and encrypted sensitive data will seldom
be decrypted, it must nonetheless be stored by the audit subsystem.
5.1 External Data Hierarchy and Identity
Suppose that the data in some external documentation D has been par-
titioned hierarchically into n degrees of sensitivity, resulting in data
D1, . . . ,Dn, where Dn is the data in the documentation that is most sen-
sitive, and D1 is the data that is the least sensitive. In our system, all data
in Dn will be encrypted using an IBE identifier IDn = (id1). We suggest this
identifier be derived from non-sensitive descriptive information such as the
HCO’s identity, the patient’s identity, degree of sensitivity, and time. Data in
Dn−1 will be assigned an identifier IDn−1 = (id1, id2) and so on. Finally, data
in D1 will be assigned an identifier ID1 = (id1, ..., idn). As an example, the
billing table shown in Table 5.1 is hierarchically organized into 3 sensitivity
patient HCO date level1 level2 level3
eeb7... Carl... 2013... EncID1,1(cs..) EncID1,2(HE...) EncID1,3(73.8)
d994... Pro... 2013... EncID2,1(ra..) EncID2,2(MC...) EncID2,3(279)
4221... NW... 2013... EncID3,1(pq..) EncID3,2(PL...) EncID3,3(11.6)
Table 5.1: observes-in-bill table
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levels. Information concerning observation result that a patient receives is
level 3 sensitive (most sensitive), observation type is level 2 sensitive, and
provider information is level 1 sensitive (least sensitive).
5.2 Billing Data Encryption
Table 5.1 shows encrypted patient observation information taken from illus-
trative medical bills. Consider data D that contains exactly the first row of
the table. Within D, data at the highest level of sensitivity, D3(= 73.8), will
be assigned identity ID3 = (id1) which is the concatenation eeb728473e1949a
|| Carle07RQ12 || 2013:09:08:10:18:41 || level3 of non-sensitive identifying in-
formation. The identity of less sensitive data, D2(= HE...), is ID2 = (id1, id2),
where id2 = level2. Finally, the identity of the least sensitive data D1(= cs...)
is ID1 = (id1, id2, id3), where id3 = level1. External documentation at
each level of sensitivity (D1, ..., Dn) is encrypted using the assigned iden-
tities IDi (1 ≤ i ≤ n). For i = 1 to n, the ADP or the HCOs run
HIBE.Encrypt(Pub, IDi,Di) to get a corresponding ciphertext EncIDi(Di). For
example, EncID1,3(73.8) in Table 5.1 represents the encryption of the data D3.
The corresponding HIBE encryption would be HIBE.Encrypt(Pub, ID1,3, 73.8)
where ID1,3 = ID3.
This example is illustrative: All external documentation in our system is
organized in tables and encrypted with the HIBE. Identities used for encryp-
tion may have cell-, column- or table-granularity, depending on the nature
of the documentation.
5.3 Issuance of Secret Keys and Decryption
When the audit algorithm requests encrypted data, the audit agent requests
an appropriate secret key from the KGC for decryption. Assume that the
audit agent needs the secret key corresponding to IDk. To issue an appropri-
ate secret key to the audit agent, the KGC runs HIBE.Extract(Pub,mk, IDk)
using its master key mk to get skIDk . After receiving skIDk from the KGC,
the audit agent runs HIBE.Decrypt(Pub, skIDk , EncIDk(Dk)) to obtain Dk. If
the audit agent needs additional information at any level k′ that is lower
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than k, the audit agent runs HIBE.Delegate(Pub, skIDk , IDk′) to get a secret
key skIDk′ , and then runs HIBE.Decrypt(Pub, skIDk′ , EncIDk′ (Dk′)) to get Dk′ .
This does not require communication with the KGC.
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CHAPTER 6
AUDIT WITH EXPLANATIONS
We first review an audit algorithm, reduce [3], that our infrastructure builds
on. Then we present an algorithm simplify that augments the output of
reduce with an intuitive explanation of why a certain access is justified or
unjustified.
6.1 An Audit Algorithm for Incomplete Logs
Garg et al. [3] develop an algorithm for finding violations of a policy on system
logs. Their algorithm takes into consideration incompleteness of information
in logs. Incompleteness has many practical causes. For example, if the policy
carries the obligation “a notice must be sent in the next 30 days”, then before
the 30 day deadline is reached, the log may not contain enough information
to decide whether or not this obligation is met. Similarly, non-mechanizable
facts such as “some responsible party has a reasonable belief that...”, on
which policies often rely, cannot be represented in automatically generated
system logs.
To account for incompleteness, the reduce algorithm uses a best-effort ap-
proach; it checks as much of the policy as possible given the available log
and returns a residual policy that captures policy conditions which could
not be verified. The residual policy can be examined by human auditors or
re-checked by invoking reduce when more information is available. Formally,
policies are represented in first-order logic and log incompleteness is mod-
eled using three-valued logic, where a log is viewed as an abstract structure
that maps a predicate (fact) P to tt, when P is true; ff, when P is false; or
uu, when information about P is not available. For an atomic predicate P
mapped to tt, ff or uu by the log, reduce returns >, ⊥ and P respectively.
The algorithm recursively reduces the sub-formulas of the policy formula
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and the residual formula mostly preserves the structure of the input policy
formula.
A second problem addressed by Garg et al.’s work is that checking pol-
icy compliance with first-order quantification over an infinite domain is, in
general, undecidable. To resolve the issue, Garg et al. restrict policies to a
fragment of first-order logic through syntactic and other statically verifiable
conditions. In this restricted fragment, both the universal and existential
quantifiers are guarded by a condition, written c. The quantifiers have forms
∀x.c(x) ⊃ ϕ and ∃x.c(x) ∧ ϕ, and it is guaranteed (statically) that the
number of substitutions for x that makes c true is always finite. With these
restrictions, both universal and existential quantifiers can be handled eas-
ily. Garg et al. argue that even the restricted logic is very expressive; in
particular, all of the HIPAA Privacy Rule can be represented in it.
When reduce produces an actual audit decision (policy violation or not)
instead of a residual policy, it helps the audit process to have an intuitive
explanation of why that decision was made. For instance, it is helpful to know
that a physician’s access to a medical record in a hospital was allowed because
the patient was referred to that hospital, or because that the patient visited
that facility. In this chapter, we describe an extension to the reduce algorithm
that provides such an explanation. Since we build on reduce directly, we
inherit solutions to both problems mentioned above from Garg et al’s work.
6.2 Explanation Generation
We begin by introducing the syntax of policies and explanations. Then, we
describe an extended reduce algorithm that returns in the output additional
information about the internal computation of reduce to help generate an
explanation subsequently. Finally, we present the explanation generation
algorithm and prove its correctness.
6.2.1 Policy syntax
Following the prior work [3], we use a first-order logic as the policy speci-
fication language. We summarize the syntax of formulas and explanations
in Figure 6.1. We write α to denote formulas and ϕ to denote generalized
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Conj clause C ::=
∧
i ϕi
Disj clause D ::=
∨
i ϕi
Formula α ::= 〈`〉P | 〈`〉> | 〈`〉⊥ | 〈`〉C | 〈`〉D
| 〈`〉∀~x.(c ⊃ ϕ) | 〈`〉∃~x.(c ∧ ϕ)
| σ B ϕ
Generalized form. ϕ ::= α | expl(>, γ) | expl(⊥, γ)
Explanation γ ::= ` | ` ◦ γ | γ1 ⊕ γ2 | σ B γ
Figure 6.1: Syntax of formulas and explanations
formulas, which are either formulas or audit decisions (> = no violation, ⊥
= violation) coupled with explanations γ. Formulas include atomic predi-
cates, true (>), false (⊥), conjunctions (∧) and disjunctions (∨) of formulas
(denoted C and D, respectively), and first-order quantifiers (∀ and ∃). Each
formula is annotated with a policy label, written `. Labels have no semantic
meaning except to establish a syntactic link between an explanation and the
original formula from which the explanation was derived. The formula σBϕ
means that the substitution for free variables in ϕ is σ. This formula itself is
not used for policy specification. It can appear in residual formulas output
by our extended reduce algorithm. c denotes a restricted class of formulas
borrowed from [3]; readers may ignore the distinction between c and α for
the purpose of understanding this chapter.
An explanation γ corresponds to a sub-tree of labels of a formula’s ab-
stract syntax tree. An explanation is only meaningful relative to a formula.
Explanations can be a single label, which points to a leaf position of the
formula. A concatenated explanation ` ◦ γ is an explanation for a formula
labeled by ` at the root, where γ is, recursively, the explanation of the root’s
children. An explanation can also combine explanations from branches of a
conjunction or disjunction (denoted γ1⊕ γ2). Finally, an explanation can be
guarded by a substitution σ (syntax: σ B γ).
6.2.2 Extended Reduce Algorithm
The reduce algorithm, as presented in [3], takes as argument a policy for-
mula α and an audit log L and returns a residual policy α′, which may be >
(no violation), ⊥ (violation) or another formula called the residual formula
(meaning that critical information is absent from the log; α′ must be checked
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reduce(L, 〈`〉P, σ) =

〈`〉> if L(Pσ) = tt
〈`〉⊥ if L(Pσ) = ff
〈`〉P if L(Pσ) = uu
reduce(L, 〈`〉∧ni=1 ϕi, σ) = 〈`〉∧ni=1 reduce(L, ϕi, σ)
reduce(L, 〈`〉∀~x.(c ⊃ ϕ), σ) =
let {σ1, . . . , σn} ← ŝat(L, c · σ)
{~ti ← σi(~x)}ni=1
S ← {~t1, . . . , ~tn}
{ψi ← reduce(L, ϕ, σ · σ1)}ni=1
ψ′ ← ∀~x.((c ∧ ~x 6∈ S) ⊃ ϕ)
return 〈`〉(σ1 B ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ σn B ψn ∧ ψ′)
reduce(L, σ′ B ϕ, σ) = σ′ B reduce(L, ϕ, σ · σ′)
reduce(L, expl(>(⊥), γ), σ) = expl(>(⊥), γ)
Figure 6.2: selected rules for reduce
when more information is available). To extend reduce to generate expla-
nations, we change it to take as input a policy represented as a generalized
formula ϕ, a log L and, additionally, a substitution σ for free variables of ϕ.
The output of our extended reduce algorithm is also a generalized formula.
If the output is α, it means that some information necessary for audit is
missing from the log, and α is the residual policy to be checked when that
information becomes available. The output expl(>, γ) means that there is
no policy violation and γ explains why that is the case. Similarly, the output
expl(⊥, γ) signals a policy violation justified by explanation γ.
Selected rules for the extended reduce algorithm are presented in Fig-
ure 6.2. When the formula is atomic 〈`〉P , reduce returns 〈`〉>, 〈`〉⊥ and
〈`〉Pσ, when L(Pσ) is tt, ff and uu, respectively. For a universally quan-
tified formula 〈`〉∀~x.(c ⊃ ϕ), reduce first finds the set S of substitutions for
~x that make c true, using a special function called ŝat in [3]. The details
of ŝat are unimportant here; the only important point is that S is always
finite. The output of reduce is the conjunction of all the formulas obtained
by reducing ϕ(~x)σσi, for each σi in S, and ψ
′, which is the same universally
quantified formula as the input formula, except that the guard of the quan-
tifiers includes an additional constraint that the substitutions S need not be
considered. The substitution σi marks ψi to help explanation generation.
The last clause ψ′ is necessary in the residual formula because we do not as-
sume a priori that the log L determines all possible substitutions for ~x that
will satisfy c in future.
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sc(
∧n
i=1 ϕi) =

simplify(ϕi) n = 1
expl(⊥, γ) if simplify(ϕ1) = expl(⊥, γ)
or sc(
∧n
i=2 ϕi) = expl(⊥, γ)
expl(>, γ1 ⊕ γ2) if simplify(ϕ1) = expl(>, γ1)
and sc(
∧n
i=2 ϕi) = expl(>, γ2)
ϕ′1 ∧ ϕ′2 if simplify(ϕ1) = ϕ′1
and sc(
∧n
i=2 ϕi) = ϕ
′
2 and ϕ1 or ϕ2 = α
Figure 6.3: Simplify for conjunctive formulas
simplify(〈`〉>) = expl(>, `)
simplify(〈`〉∧ni=1 ϕi) =
expl(⊥, ` ◦ γ) if sc(∧ni=1 ϕi) = expl(⊥, γ)
expl(>, ` ◦ γ) if sc(∧ni=1 ϕi) = expl(>, γ)
〈`〉C if sc(∧ni=1 ϕi) = C
simplify(σ B ϕ) =
expl(⊥, σ B γ) if simplify(ϕ) = expl(⊥, γ)
expl(>, σ B γ) if simplify(ϕ) = expl(>, γ)
σ B α if simplify(ϕ) = α
Figure 6.4: Selected rules of simplify
When the input formula is guarded by a substitution σ′ (case σ′ B ϕ),
reduce checks the formula with a composed substitution σσ′ because the free
variables in ϕ can be in the union of the domains of σ and σ′. The residual
formula is still guarded by σ′. When the input is a pair of > (⊥) and an
explanation, reduce simply returns the input formula, since the formula has
already been reduced (perhaps in a prior invocation of reduce).
6.2.3 Explanations
Next, we define a function simplify that takes a generalized formula and
returns another generalized formula, in simpler form. The function simplify
serves a dual purpose. First, it rewrites the original formula using basic
rules of logic, e.g., it replaces ϕ ∧ > with ϕ. Second, and more importantly,
if the input formula is equivalent to either > or ⊥, it produces a succinct
explanation of why that is the case by combining and selectively retaining
explanations from the original formula. So, the output of simplify is either
a residual policy formula α, or a binary answer (> or ⊥) paired with an
explanation γ.
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We present a few key rules for simplify in Figure 6.4. If the input is 〈`〉>,
then the input formula (>) is trivially satisfied and the output is simply
> coupled with the explanation, which in this case is simply the label `.
Hence, the output is expl(>, `). For input conjunctions 〈`〉∧ni=1 ϕi, we use a
sub-routine sc, which returns the result of simplifying the conjunctive clause
(explained later). When sc returns an explanation, simplify returns the same
explanation extended with the top-level label of the entire conjunction: `◦γ.
When sc returns a formula α, simplify wraps α with the label `. Disjunction
is similarly handled, though not shown. When the input is σ B ϕ, simplify
is invoked on the formula ϕ. If simplify(ϕ) returns expl(>, γ) or expl(⊥, γ),
then the final explanation guards γ with substitution σ. If simplify(ϕ) returns
a formula α, the output is the formula σ B α. Although not shown, simplify
returns the input as is if the input begins with a quantifier.
The sub-routine sc for conjunctive formulas is listed in Figure 6.3. sc is
defined inductively on the number of conjuncts. In the base case, there is only
one formula, so sc calls simplify. In the inductive case, if the simplification
of the first formula ϕ1 or the simplification of the rest of the conjunction
(
∧n
i=2 ϕi) is logical falsity (expl(⊥, γ)), then the entire conjunction can be
rewritten to false and the explanation of why this conjunction is false is
the same as that of the branch that makes it false (i.e., γ). On the other
hand, if both branches can be simplified to (expl(>, γi)), then the entire
conjunction is true and the explanation combines the explanations of both
branches (written γ1 ⊕ γ2). When at least one of the branches can only
be simplified to a formula, the entire conjunctive formula is neither true
nor false, and therefore we cannot generate an explanation. Instead, the
simplified formula is a conjunction. There is a similar simplification sub-
routine for disjunctions, where the roles of truth and falsity are reversed. We
omit the straightforward details.
Level 1 (least) Level 2 Level 3 (most)
provider-id (p2) service-type (vl) OBS-value(va)
INS-company (p) INS-plan (c)
OBS-type (ty)
Table 6.1: Sensitivity levels in the audit scenario
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6.3 Example Scenario
In this chapter, we present a simple audit scenario that illustrates reduce,
simplify and HIBE.
6.3.1 Policy
Suppose a HIE’s policy for data sharing is that a provider p1 can send detailed
information about a patient q to another provider p2 if, within a year of such
sharing, p2 bills the insurance company for services provided to q at p2. The
encoding of a HIE’s policy for data sharing is shown below. A provider p1
can send a patient document m to a provider p2 at time t (send(p1, p2,m, t)),
where (1) m describes patient q (hasattrof(m, q)), (2) m includes detailed
information ty and va about the patient, e.g., ty is the type of observation q
is under and va is the result of the observation (includes(m, ty, va, t)), (3) q is
classified as type tp and provided with service vl at t (patientInfo(q, tp, vl, t)),
(4) p2 works in organization o (organization(p2, o, t)), and (5) organization
o records that patient q has an insurance plan p from company c at time
t (insuranceInfo(q, p, c, t)); then there should be a consequent patient med-
ical bill of type b at time t′ (medical-bill(q, b, t′)), t′ should be within 365
days of the data sharing, the organization o should note that q has an in-
surance plan c with company p (insurance(q, p, c, o, t′)), and either the bill
is from q’s visit to p2 or for an observation carried out by p2 on q. Predi-
cates visits-in-bill(q, p2, vl, o, t
′) and observes-in-bill(q, p2, ty, va, o, t′) represent
p2’s records of medical bills of the two specific types.
ϕpol = 〈DISC〉
∀p1, p2,m, q, t, ty, va, tp, vl, o, p, c
send(p1, p2,m, t)∧ hasattrof(m, q)∧
includes(m, ty, va, t)∧ patientInfo(q, tp, vl, t)∧
organization(p2, o, t)∧ insuranceInfo(q, p, c, t)
⊃〈AC〉∃t′, b.medical-bill(q, b, t′)∧
〈BLL〉(〈time〉timein(t, t′, t+ 365)
∧〈INS〉insurance(q, p, c, o, t′)
∧〈DJ〉(〈VST〉(〈B〉b = visit-history∧
〈visit〉visits-in-bill(q, p2, vl, o, t′)))
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∨(〈OBS〉(〈B〉b = observation∧
〈obsv〉observes-in-bill(q, p2, ty,
va, o, t′))))
6.3.2 Audit Logs
The internal log contains information about all the predicates to the left
of the implication in ϕpol as well as the predicate medical-bill. Predicates
visits-in-bill and observes-in-bill record detailed information about patients’
hospital visits, which are considered external documentations that belong to
the hospital. Both external and internal logs are represented as database
tables. Tables visits-in-bill and observes-in-bill are HIBE-encrypted according
to levels shown in Table 6.1.
For illustration, we assume that the following substitution σ is the only
one that satisfies the condition of the outermost universal quantification on
the example log (here, terms like P1 starting with uppercase letters are
constants):
σ = p1 7→P1 , p2 7→P2 ,m 7→M1 , q 7→Q1 , t 7→T1 , ty 7→TY1 ,
va 7→VA1 , tp 7→TP1 , vl 7→VL1 , o 7→O1 , p 7→PI , c 7→C1
We further assume that timein(T1 ,T2 ,T1 + 365 ) and
timein(T1 ,T3 ,T1 + 365 ) are true. Below are the (only) log entries
about predicates to the right of ⊃ in ϕpol.
medical-bill(Q1 , visit-history ,O1 ,T2 )
medical-bill(Q1 , observation,O1 ,T3 )
visits-in-bill(Q1 ,P2 ,VL1 ,O1 ,T2 )
observes-in-bill(Q1 ,P2 ,TY2 ,VA2 ,O2 ,T3 )
insurance(Q1 ,PI ,C1 ,O1 ,T2 )
6.3.3 Reduce on Encrypted Data
In the initial phase of audit, the auditor does not possess decryption keys
for external data. This poses no problem because reduce can handle log
incompleteness; reduce treats the log incomplete in predicates like visits-in-bill,
and simply returns such predicates in the residual output. The output of
running reduce on ϕpol and the example log is shown in the next page.
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ϕr1 =〈DISC〉σB
〈AC〉σ1 B 〈BLL〉
(〈time〉>∧ 〈INS〉insurance(q, p, c, o, t′)∧
〈DJ〉(〈VST〉(〈B〉>∧ 〈visit〉visits-in-bill(q, p2, vl, o, t′))
∨〈OBS〉(〈B〉⊥∧
〈obsv〉observes-in-bill(q, p2, ty, va, o, t′)))
∨σ2 B 〈BLL〉
(〈time〉>∧ 〈INS〉insurance(q, p, c, o, t′)∧
〈DJ〉(〈VST〉(〈B〉⊥∧ 〈visit〉visits-in-bill(q, p2, vl, o, t′))
∨〈OBS〉(〈B〉>∧
〈obsv〉observes-in-bill(q, p2, ty, va, o, t′)))
Here,
σ1=t
′ 7→T2 , b 7→visit-history
σ2=t
′ 7→T3 , b 7→observation
The existentially quantified variables t′ and b in ϕpol have two possible
substitutions, corresponding to the two entries in the medical-bill table. The
residual formula hence contains a disjunction over these two possibilities.
6.3.4 Simplification
Next, we call simplify on ϕr1 to condense as many explanations as possible.
This yields:
ϕs1 =〈DISC〉σB
〈AC〉σ1 B 〈BLL〉
(expl(>, time)∧ 〈INS〉insurance(q, p, c, o, t′)∧
〈DJ〉(〈VST〉(expl(>, B)∧
〈visit〉visits-in-bill(q, p2, vl, o, t′))
∨expl(⊥, OBS ◦ B)))
∨σ2 B 〈BLL〉
(expl(⊥, time)∧ 〈INS〉insurance(q, p, c, o, t′)∧
〈DJ〉(expl(⊥, VST ◦ B)
∨〈OBS〉(expl(>, B)∧
〈obsv〉observes-in-bill(q, p2, ty, va, o, t′))))
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6.3.5 Requesting Decryption Keys
To proceed further, we must decrypt the insurance table and either the
observes-in-bill table or the visits-in-bill table. Since the maximum sensitivity
level of entries in visits-in-bill is lower than that in observes-in-bill, the audit
agent asks the KGC for keys at level 2 (the maximum level of visits-in-bill
and insurance).1 The KGC generates keys based on its master key mk and
gives them to the audit agent. Both the KGC and the audit agent may log
why the keys were generated (by recording the residual formula ϕs1) to aid a
subsequent audit of this audit process. The audit agent then decrypts entries
in those two tables and provides the formula ϕs1 with the decrypted tables
(added to the original log) to reduce. The output of reduce is the following
formula ϕd1. Note that the clause guarded by σ2 remains the same because
even the extended log contains no information to reduce it.
ϕd1 =
〈DISC〉σB
〈AC〉σ1 B 〈BLL〉
(expl(>, time)∧ expl(>, INS)∧
〈DJ〉(〈VST〉(expl(>, B)∧expl(>, visit))∨expl(⊥, OBS ◦ B)))
∨σ2 B 〈BLL〉
(expl(⊥, time)∧ 〈INS〉insurance(q, p, c, o, t′)∧
〈DJ〉(expl(⊥, VST ◦ B)
∨〈OBS〉(expl(>, B)∧
〈obsv〉observes-in-bill(q, p2, ty, va, o, t′))))
6.3.6 Simplification and Explanation
Finally, simplify is run on ϕd1 to obtain the following output:
ϕs2 = expl(>, DISC ◦ σ B AC ◦ σ1 B 〈BLL〉◦
(time⊕ INS⊕ (DJ ◦ VST ◦ (B⊕ visit)))
The result indicates that the log satisfies the policy. The reason is the
following: (1) σ is the only substitution that makes the conditions associated
1For simplicity, we assume here that the audit agent decrypts entire tables atomically.
In practice, it could decrypt only specific rows of interest.
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with the action send true and (2) the conditions required for such a send (AC)
under σ are true. The explanation of (2) is that there exists a substitution σ1
that matches an entry in medical-bill and makes BLL true. More concretely,
the time of the bill, the insurance information, and hospital’s billing record
of the patient all satisfy the policy constraints. In particular, the hospital’s
record shows that the patient visited the hospital (VST).
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CHAPTER 7
IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
To validate our proposal, we implement the HIE (Figure 4.1) based on IHE
Profile XDS.b [9]. It supports the sharing of patient clinical documents based
on the HIE’s document registry which keeps a patient document index and
location where the documents are stored in. Based on these, the web-based
document viewer looks for patient documents based on patient information.
We implement a Java API to create ATNA-based XML logs [11] on top of
HIE. We report our evaluation of HIBE key generation, decryption and the
reduce algorithm based on a policy encoding the guidelines [36] of the ONC for
Health Information Technology and a synthetic audit log. All experiments
are performed on a machine with an Intel Core i7 2.3GHz processor and
1GB of memory, running Ubuntu 12.04. We use the Charm library [37] to
implement the HIBE module. In particular, we use a symmetric curve with
a 512-bit base field to initiate a group in the elliptic curve with bilinear
pairings. For illustration purposes, we assume a maximum depth of three
sensitivity levels in the hierarchy. To encrypt arbitrary messages with HIBE,
we use a hybrid encryption scheme: we extract a session key after hashing
[14] a random element from the message space of HIBE, encrypt messages
with the session key via AES (CBC mode) symmetric encryption and encrypt
the random element using HIBE [2].
7.1 Implementation
7.1.1 HIE Simulation
We chose to use NIST’s open source package, IheOS [38] adopting IHE Profile
XDS.b, described in Chapter 4. We used both Apache Tomcat 5.5.23 as a
web application server and Apache 2.2.23 as a web server for our patient
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document sharing server, built a web service for a patient document viewer,
and used Postgresql 8.4.17 to create the Document Registry. To adopt ATNA
as the audit mechanism in our HIE system, OpenSSL 1.0.1 14 was used for the
user and node authentication and RFC-3881-based XML logs were generated
by a Java API ATNA generator (Appendix A) for the audit trail.
7.1.2 HIBE Module
We used the Charms library [37] to implement our cryptographic module
HIBE-BBG05 (Appendix D) and prototype an HIBE scheme [2]. As a plat-
form to implement HIBE, we used Python2.7, Pyparsing 2.0.1, GMP 5.1.2
and PBC 5.14. To initiate a group in the elliptic curve with billinear pair-
ings, we used a symmetric curve with a 512-bit base field. We decided on a
maximum of three depths of sensitivity in the hierarchy for the evaluation
shown in Chapter 7.4. To encrypt arbitrary messages with the HIBE scheme,
we used key encapsulation. In other words, we extracted a session key after
hashing the group GT elements with a Waters hash technique, encrypted a
message with a session key via AES (CBC mode) symmetric encryption and
encrypted a session key using HIBE.
7.2 Policy
According to the ONC, providers requesting a patient’s IIHI by electronic
means for treatment must verify a treatment relationship with a patient by
attestation or artifacts such as patient registration, prescriptions, consults,
and referrals. The top-level encoding of the policy is shown below and con-
sists of a disjunction of six sub clauses, and at least one must be satisfied for
each access. The details of these clauses are presented in Appendix C and
ϕpol, shown in Chapter 6.3, is a simplified encoding of ϕBilling.
ϕONC = ∀p1, p2,m, q, t, ty, va, tp, vl, o, p, c
send(p1, p2,m, t)∧ hasattrof(m, q)∧
includes(m, ty, va, t)∧ patientInfo(q, tp, vl, t)∧
organization(p2, o, t)∧ insuranceInfo(q, p, c, t)
⊃ϕException ∨ ϕBilling ∨ ϕRegistration ∨ ϕPrescription
∨ϕReferral ∨ ϕConsult
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7.3 Audit Logs
We generate synthetic data representing both external audit logs and internal
ATNA logs (Appendix B). The generated ATNA log has a size of 5.7 MB,
which represents 9,644 accesses to HIE over 4 months (this realistic number is
based on Johnson et al.’s data [39]). The external audit data has a size of 12
MB, and includes roughly 9,644 entries about patient registration, billing and
referral. The external logs are encrypted using HIBE with three pre-defined
sensitivity levels.
7.3.1 External documentation Simulation
To simulate the information about patient registration, billing, and prescrip-
tion, which we relied upon for external documentation in this paper, we uti-
lized HL7 [10] messages. For patient registration, we simulated data based on
”Register a patient”, which is an HL7 ADT A04 meesage, since this message
is used in updating patient clinical data to change address or add next of kin.
This clinical data will then be sent upon request to different places such as
laboratories. For patient billing, we simulated data based on ”Order”, which
is an HL7 ORM 001 message, ”Add patient account”, which is an HL7 BAR
P01 message, and ”Unsolicited transmission of an observation”, which is an
HL7 ORU R01 message. The ORM message is used in laboratories when they
receive orders from referring providers via an HL7 interface, which indicates
that some of entries in the message are needed to complete a medical bill.
The BAR and the ORU messages are in fact used in imaging centers when
referring providers request patient billing information and final coding. For
prescriptions, we simulated the PMP, as described in Chapter 4, based on
the Illinois Compiled Statutes (ILCS) [40]. All entries of simulated external
documentation are stored in three tables, the Patient Registration, the PMP
and the Billing, in the Audit Logs repository, which is an SQLite database.
7.3.2 ATNA log
Even though the ATNA generator (Appendix A) creates ATNA log entries
for log-in and log-out in HIE, assigning a new patient ID to a new patient,
submitting a new patient document(s) and retrieving a patient document(s),
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Key
Gen.
(ms)
Session
Key
Dec.
(ms)
Msg
Dec.
(ms)
Reduce
(ms)
Single
access
(ms)
Day
(s)
Month
(m)
Level3 17.73 20.76 0.06 42.6 81.15 6.57 3.26
Level2 11.73 13.73 0.04 41.3 66.80 5.41 2.68
Table 7.1: Consumption time for HIBE and reduce
we only use the logs that are generated by retrieval of a patient document(s)
for audit analysis since such retrieval accompanies the same key entries as
in other transactions. All entries in this log are captured in tables whose
names are Predicates in SQLite. Especially sensitive information, such as a
diagnosis code, is already decoded in the audit logs prior to audit analysis as
specified in the ATNA Profile. Therefore, we do not include such a decoding
process in our audit system.
7.4 Evaluation Results
We evaluate the efficiency and scalability of both HIBE and the reduce al-
gorithm. We use the audit scenario shown in Chapter 6.3 and break it into
three phases. In the first phase, the auditor does not have any keys, and we
measure the time reduce takes to generate a residual policy; in the second
phase, we measure the time it takes the KGC to generate a decryption key
given an ID, and the time it takes to decrypt relevant log data using the key
(because our encryption is hybrid, the latter further splits into the time taken
to decrypt the symmetric key, and the time take to decrypt the data using
the symmetric key); in the third phase, we run reduce again and measure the
time reduce takes to check the residual policy on the decrypted data. We
run the audit scenario on two accesses, one requires a decryption key of level
2, and the other requires a decryption key of level 3. The size of messages
encrypted up to level 2, shown in Table 7.1, is 416B including the session key
and the size of messages encrypted up to level 3 is 580B including the session
key. Table 7.1 summarizes our results. All numbers are averages of 20 trials
(all have negligible standard deviations). The first column shows the time
taken to generate HIBE decryption keys, the second column indicates the
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time needed to decrypt a session key with the HIBE key, the third column
shows the time to decrypt a message using AES and the fourth column shows
the total time consumed by reduce, which is derived by adding up the time
for each iteration of reduce(before and after decryption). As can be seen,
the total time is split almost evenly between reduce and the cryptographic
operations for data at level 3 and is dominated by reduce for data at level 2.
Johnson et al [39] report approximately 81 accesses per day in a typical HIE.
Based on this number, we calculate the total time for auditing all accesses in
a day and in a month to be 6.57/5.41 seconds (level 3/level 2) and 3.26/2.68
minutes, respectively. Since audit is an oﬄine process, we consider these
numbers practical.
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CHAPTER 8
DISCUSSION
8.1 Practical Issues in Deployment
Integrating our audit architecture into an actual distributed healthcare en-
vironment will be challenging since it will require the HCOs not only to use
the HIE system but to accept the audit infrastructure as sufficiently secure.
In addition, the details of the process for accepting diverse formats of exter-
nal documentation from HCOs and converting them into the ATNA based
audit record, as would be needed for use with our infrastructure, will need to
be worked out. In addition, even though HIBE supports privacy preserving
audit, we still need to monitor audit system during collection and analysis
of audit records if the audit system is compromised by malicious auditors,
which subsequently discloses sensitive information in the audit data. Fur-
thermore, our current work did not involve access control, however, we need
to utilize our explanations about the legitimacy of access to establish ac-
cess control for HIE in the future since audit analysis can only notify of the
violations after the fact. Establishing fine-grained access control for HIE is
cumbersome by exceptional cases such as emergency that might result in false
positives or false negatives in the application of access control, and which can
significantly affect the effective running of HIE. For example, Bob accesses
Alice’s clinical record through HIE in an emergency: his allowed access level
is low since he is not her PCP. In this case, HIE needs to give him a higher
level of access to provide him with sufficient health information for Alice’s
treatment. We need an access control model that can automatically process
these exceptions, which can be feasible with our audit infrastructure. De-
tails concerning converting file format of documentation, access control, and
follow-up monitoring of our infrastructure are left for future work.
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8.2 Limitation of Audit Algorithm
In the examples shown in Chapter 6.3, the encrypted tables are not used to
generate substitutions for quantified variables; i.e., they do not appear in the
guards of quantified formulas. It could be cases where the guards refer to ex-
ternal data. For instance, ty and va can be encrypted in includes(m, ty , va, t).
The current method for handling encrypted data does not work for such sce-
nario because reduce requires that no predicates in the guards be subjective.
We can augment reduce to allow encrypted data to appear in the guard po-
sition as follows. When searching for substitutions for quantified variables
based on a guard c, we mark the substitutions that depend on encrypted
data to indicate that such substitution exists, but the concrete values re-
quire decryption. In the simplification phase, we decide whether decryption
is needed. It could be the case that such decryption is not needed. For
instance, if VST branch is true, then OBS is irrelevant, so we do not need to
decrypt ty or va. In more complicated scenarios where there are multiple
encrypted predicates in the guard, and identifying the substitutions requires
examining the values of encrypted data, we need additional mechanisms to
integrate decryption key requests with reduce. We leave them as future work.
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CHAPTER 9
CASE STUDY
9.1 Auditor Privilege
According to ISO specifications [41], the EHR audit log and EHR requestors
and provider must all conform to the ISO data flow protocol as well as to the
access control policy, which consists of access control factors being collected
in the data flow. ISO has spelled out sensitivity levels for EHR records,
functional roles 5 of EHR recipients, and mapping instructions applicable
to various recipient functional roles and record sensitivity levels. We will
1Class of identity, pseudo identity, endpoint address, organization, etc.
2Provider Directory.
3Hospital, IDN, Provider Org, Provider, HIE, Connector, etc.
4for individuals, NIST has levels of proofing, for organizations, the individual repre-
senting the org is proofed, and then the org identity is established through records search.
Not sure how apps (services) are proofed, or if that is even relevant, although it maybe
should be.
5Functional role is a role at the hospital such as consultant pediatrician at a hospital
or head of child screening for the region. The principals (person, agent, etc) can hold one
or more functional roles
Identity Axis Policy Axis Contract Axis
Identity (name) stores a copy?(Y/N) Reciprocal obligations
Identity Details 1 PD2 policy Notification of breach
Identity Type3 Patient disambiguation Explicit AGMT
Proofing level4 MPI MGMT Explicit practices
Certified?(Y/N) Consent REQ Suspending REQ
There is chain(s)?(Y/N) Privacy policies Termination REQ
Accreditation Security policies Update REQ
Accrediting entity Audit review policy Inspection AGMT
User Authentication level Standards supported AGMT Version
User authorization type Profiles supported
Authorization content Permitted purposes
Contact person
Table 9.1: User Trust Attributes
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utilize these specifications with two strategies in mind. The first one is to
build future access control based on analysis of audit logs that conform to
these specifications. The pieces of information in the audit log explanations
generated by our audit log subsystem will be utilized to construct an access
policy model and we will request specific additional information that has
not already been gathered through the audit log from external third parties
based on ISO-specified standards. Therefore, we will establish a plausible
access policy for HIE by analyzing the audit log. Our second strategy is to
incorporate the access policy into the auditor viewer. If we need to allow
patients or medical providers as well as auditors to investigate the audit log,
we will comply with ISO specifications to limit all three of them to accessing
audit information only at the appropriate level of sensitivity.
9.2 Access Policy for HIE
HHS has provided a document entitled Trust Framework for HIE [42], which
suggests that when a provider requests an EHR, the request has to include
trust attribute profile, which explains the conditions for a trusted exchange.
This profile is established and verified through means such as self-attestation,
certification, or accreditation. If a requesters profile meets local policy re-
quirements, the requested records will be sent to the requester. HHS recom-
mends grouping attributes into three categories, namely identity, policy, and
contract to describe the initial trust framework, since EHR communications
may vary depending on local policy. These groupings are helpful to determine
whether to share information between unaffiliated entities. In addition, HHS
proposes that the automation of the evaluation of trust attributes (Table 9.1)
can make the process of assessing differences in trust elements more quick
and efficient. Accordingly, we will extend our work, a logic-based reasoning
with formal policy, to effectively automate a system to verify whether the
trust attributes of principals satisfy the policy or not.
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Figure 9.1: User Access control via Trust Attributes in Audits
9.3 User Authorization Using Trust Attributes
Figure 9.1 illustrates the overview of access control mechanism for HIEs. The
audit log is regularly accumulated through the audit subsystem and trust at-
tributes (Table 9.1) are extracted per a user such as medical provider, on a
daily basis. When a provider requests the medical record via the HIE (path
MRQ1), the HIE needs to get the user access permission to the target record
from the access control (path MRQ2). Based on requester information, the
access control retrieves user trust attributes from the audit subsystem (path
TAR1 and TAR2). If attributes don’t exist, the request will be manually
reviewed by the source provider. The access control encodes user trust at-
tributes into the first-order logic and requests applicable local policy from
the source provider (path LPR1 and LPR2). If the policy is successfully
retrieved (path LPR3 and LPR4), it is converted into the first-order logic as
well. Since the access control includes the logic-based algorithm similar to
our audit algorithm, it can successfully check if user trust attributes conform
to the local policy. If the HIE decides to admit user request based on the
result (true or false) from access control module, the target medical record
is sent to the requester from the source provider (path MRP3 and MRP4).
If not, the user request is denied (path MRP1).
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION
We have proposed an audit infrastructure for broker-based HIE systems that
limits the information shared through HIE. The audit logs complying with
ATNA are stored in a centralized audit repository to make it easy to ef-
fectively audit HIE, with a bare minimum of them being decrypted only as
needed to justify each access using HIBE. Our extended logic-based audit
algorithm provides further evidence of the auditors behavior, and thus in-
creases the trustworthiness of the system. Initial performance evaluation of
a prototype implementation shows that our proposed infrastructure is prac-
tical and scalable. As future work, we plan to implement the extended audit
algorithm and investigate the possibility of combining audit and access con-
trol mechanisms.
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APPENDIX A
ATNA LOG GENERATOR
// WriteXml_ret.java
package xml.create;
import java.io.*;
import java.util.*;
import java.net.*;
import java.text.*;
import java.lang.*;
import org.w3c.dom.*;
import javax.xml.transform.*;
import javax.xml.transform.stream.*;
import javax.xml.transform.dom.*;
import javax.xml.parsers.*;
import db.UserInfo;
public class WriteXml_ret
{
public void writeXml(int outcome,int filenum,String
alterid,String pid, String[] partid, String[] repid,
String[] hcid, String[] consult, String uid, String[]
sen, String gua,String com,String plan,String[]
author,String[] pclass,String[] type,String[]
value,String[] order) throws FileNotFoundException,
UnknownHostException
{
try
{
DocumentBuilderFactory docFactory =
DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
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DocumentBuilder docBuilder =
docFactory.newDocumentBuilder();
/*ATNA Elements*/
//Time
Calendar rightnow =
Calendar.getInstance();
String timenow = "";
timenow =
Integer.toString(rightnow.get(Calendar.YEA...
...
..
//Client IP address(Local)
InetAddress ip=InetAddress.getLocalHost();
//File name
String fname = "retb_"+timenow;
//User name retrieval with user id
UserInfo u = new UserInfo();
String uid =
(String)session.getAttribute("uid");
String username = u.getName(uid);
//ATNA repository(Local)
File fileXml =
new File("/usr/local/tomcat1/webapps/
atna_repository/"+fname+".xml");
Document document = null;
Element rootElement = null;
Element eventElement = null;
Element eventidElement = null;
Element eventcodeElement = null;
Element activeElement = null;
...
..
Document doc = docBuilder.newDocument();
rootElement =
(Element)doc.createElement("AuditMessage");
rootElement.setAttribute("xmlns:xsi",
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance");
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rootElement.setAttribute
("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation",
"healthcare-security-audit.xsd");
doc.appendChild(rootElement);
/* Event Identification */
eventElement =
(Element)doc.createElement("EventIdentification");
eventElement.setAttribute("EventActionCode",
"R");
...
..
/* Active Participant: Document Repository */
activeElement =
(Element)doc.createElement("ActiveParticipant");
activeElement.setAttribute("UserID",
"http://localhost:9080/tf6/services/xdsrepositoryb");
activeElement.setAttribute("UserIsRequestor",
"false");
...
..
/* Active Participant: Client */
activeElement2 =
(Element)doc.createElement("ActiveParticipant");
activeElement2.setAttribute("UserID", uid);
activeElement2.setAttribute("UserName",
username);
...
..
/* Audit Source Identification */
auditElement = (Element)doc.createElement
("AuditSourceIdentification");
auditElement.setAttribute("AuditSourceID",
"http://localhost:9080/tf6/services/xdsrepositoryb");
..
/* Participant Object Identification: Patient
*/
partElement = (Element)doc.createElement
("ParticipantObjectIdentification");
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partElement.setAttribute("ParticipantObjectID",
pid);
...
..
/* Participant Object Identification: Patient
Medical Document Details */
for(int i=0;i<filenum;i++)
{
partElement2=(Element)doc.createElement
("ParticipantObjectIdentification");
partElement2.setAttribute
("ParticipantObjectID",
partid[i]);
partElement2.setAttribute
("ParticipantObjectTypeCode",
"2");
partElement2.setAttribute
("ParticipantObjectTypeCodeRole",
"3");
partElement2.setAttribute
("ParticipantObjectSensitivity",
sen[i]);
...
..
}
/* Write and export XML */
TransformerFactory transformerFactory =
TransformerFactory.newInstance();
Transformer transformer =
transformerFactory.newTransformer();
transformer.setOutputProperty(OutputKeys.ENCODING,
"UTF-8");
...
..
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APPENDIX B
ATNA LOG
Figure B.1: Retrieve Patient Documents
Figure B.2: Referring
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Figure B.3: Billing
Figure B.4: Prescription
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APPENDIX C
FORMAL PRIVACY POLICY
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APPENDIX D
HIBE MODULE
\\hibenc_bbg05.py
’’’
Created on Jun 26, 2013
@author: Se Eun Oh (seeunoh2@illinois.edu)
’’’
#from charm.toolbox.pairinggroup import
PairingGroup,ZR,G1,G2,GT,pair
from charm.toolbox.pairinggroup import
PairingGroup,ZR,G1,G2,GT,pair
from charm.toolbox.ecgroup import ECGroup
from charm.core.math.pairing import hashPair as sha1
from charm.toolbox.symcrypto import AuthenticatedCryptoAbstraction
from charm.toolbox.iterate import dotprod2
from charm.toolbox.hash_module import Waters
import sys
import time
debug = False
class HIBE_BBG05_KeyEnc:
"""
>>> from charm.toolbox.pairinggroup import PairingGroup, GT
>>> group = PairingGroup(’SS512’)
>>> hibe = HIBE_BBG05(group)
>>> (master_public_key, master_key) = hibe.setup()
>>> ID = "bob@mail.com"
>>> (public_key, secret_key) = hibe.extract(3,
master_public_key, master_key, ID)
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>>> msg = group.random(GT)
>>> cipher_text = hibe.encrypt(master_public_key, public_key,
msg)
>>> decrypted_msg = hibe.decrypt(public_key, secret_key,
cipher_text)
>>> decrypted_msg == msg
"""
def __init__(self, groupObj):
global group, ibenc
group = groupObj
def setup(self, l=3, z=32):
""" k represents maximum depth of HIBE system,
z represents the bit size of each integer_j of identity.
"""
assert l > 0, "invalid number of levels (need more than 0)"
alpha = group.random(ZR)
beta = group.random(ZR)
"""paring group vs ecgroup"""
g = group.random(G2)
g1 = g ** alpha
g2 = group.random(G2)
g3 = group.random(G2)
h = {}
for i in range(l) :
h[i] = group.random(G2)
g2alpha = g2 ** alpha
mpk = { ’g’: g, ’g1’:g1, ’g2’:g2, ’g3’:g3, ’h’:h, ’z’:z,
’l’:l }
mk = { ’g2alpha’:g2alpha }
return (mpk, mk)
def keygen(self,level,mpk,mk,ID):
k = level
#assert k >= 1 and k <= mpk[’l’], "invalid level: 1 - %d" %
mpk[’l’]
print "z====",mpk[’z’]
I = Waters(group, k, mpk[’z’]).hash(ID)
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r = group.random(ZR)
hi = {}
for i in range(k) :
hi[i] = mpk[’h’][i] ** I[i]
mhi = 1
for t in range(k):
mhi *= hi[t]
hg3r = (mhi * mpk[’g3’]) ** r
hashID = mk[’g2alpha’] * hg3r
gr = mpk[’g’] ** r
hr = {}
for i in range(k+1,mpk[’l’]) :
hr[i] = mpk[’h’][i] ** r
return { ’ID’:ID, ’k’:k },{ ’d0’:hashID,’d1’:gr, ’dn’:hr}
"""
## Encrypt the message using key encapsulation
"""
def encrypt(self,mpk,pk,M):
if type(M) != str: raise "message not right type!"
key = group.random(GT)
s = group.random(ZR)
print "s==",s
I = Waters(group, pk[’k’], mpk[’z’]).hash(pk[’ID’])
"""
1. Key Encryption
"""
A_s = pair(mpk[’g1’],mpk[’g2’]) ** s
A = A_s * key
B = mpk[’g’] ** s
h_i = {}
for i in range(pk[’k’]):
h_i[i] = mpk[’h’][i] ** I[i]
mh_i = 1
for t in range(pk[’k’]):
mh_i *= h_i[t]
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C = (mh_i * mpk[’g3’]) ** s
"""
2. Message Encryption using key
"""
cipher = AuthenticatedCryptoAbstraction(sha1(key))
c2 = cipher.encrypt(M)
"""
3. Return : Ciphertext_Key = {A,B,C}, Ciphertext_Message =
c2
"""
return {’A’:A,’B’:B,’C’:C, ’c2’:c2} #A,B,C : Encrypted key,
c2 : Encrypted Message
def decrypt(self,pk,sk,ct):
"""
1. Key Decryption
"""
start_time = time.time()
num = ct[’A’] * pair(sk[’d1’],ct[’C’])
den = pair(ct[’B’],sk[’d0’])
key = num/den
encM_time = time.time();
"""
2. Message Decryption using key & Return decrypted message
"""
start_time2 = time.time()
cipher = AuthenticatedCryptoAbstraction(sha1(key))
encM_time2 = time.time();
return cipher.decrypt(ct[’c2’])
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